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Host country institutions and firm-level R&D influences: An analysis of European Union 
FDI in China 
  
Abstract 
 
The paper investigates the effects of institutions and their interaction with firms’ research & 
development (R&D) levels on foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows in China based on a 
sample of 680 European Union (EU) firms over the period of 1998 to 2008. Employing panel 
data estimation approaches and further augmented with the cross-validation technique, our 
results indicate that EU FDI in China is influenced by the host country’s institutions, rendering 
support to the institutional theory. Our analysis indicates that the rule of law, institutional 
reforms and the interaction between institutional reforms and R&D have significant effects on 
FDI inflows in China. Further analysis suggests that the coefficient for the interaction between 
the rule of law and R&D is positive and significant after World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
entry implying that the effects of reforms following the WTO entry much outweigh the impact 
of rule of law in EU firms’ decisions to invest in China. We also find evidence that EU firms 
tend to adjust their FDI levels in China in an attempt to reach the desired investment level. 
 
Keywords: European Union firms; China; Host country institutions; Firm-level R&D.  
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1. Introduction 
Prior studies have documented that institutions in host countries play a pivotal role in 
multinational enterprise (MNE) location and investment decisions (White et al., 2015; Grosse 
and Trevino, 2005; Doh et al., 2005; Bevan et al., 2004; Henisz, 2000). Narula and Dunning 
(2000) argue economic and institutional factors (i.e., created assets) are not only valued much 
higher than conventional “natural assets” such as access to raw materials, cost of labour and 
fear of protectionism; but in all cases, their importance have increased significantly in recent 
years. The importance of host country institutional environment stems from a number of factors 
including: (i) host country institutions represent locational advantages that make the host 
country attractive to potential foreign direct investors (Dunning, 1998); (ii) MNEs are 
increasingly seeking locations that offer the best institutional environments for their core 
competencies to be utilized efficiently (North, 1990). Khoury and Peng (2011) note that the 
nature of institutional environment in host country does not only influence the comparative 
efficiency of governance structures but also defines the conditions under which foreign 
investment occurs. Overall, it is argued that host country institutions provide a framework for 
assessing a country’s strengths and weaknesses to help foreign investors capture the 
environmental complexities facing MNEs to facilitate the formulation of investment strategy 
and decisions (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Grosse and Trevino, 2005).  
While a number of studies have examined the role of institutions in attracting FDI, relatively 
little attention has been given to the effects of interaction of host country institutional variables 
and firms’ R&D intensity on FDI inflows in emerging countries (Papanastassiou, 1997; Doh et 
al., 2005). As far as we are aware, the studies of Papanastassiou (1997) and Doh et al. (2005) 
are the only papers that have examined simultaneously the effects of R&D and host country 
institutions of the U.S. firms abroad. It is important to point out that these studies did not 
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investigate how firm level R&D interacts with host country institutions to influence FDI 
inflows. However, foreign firms making investments in a foreign market transfer their firm-
specific assets (often proprietary assets) to that market and the quality of institutions provides 
an important means to protect these assets from unwarranted dissemination (Khoury and Peng, 
2011). Thus, foreign firms with proprietary assets such as R&D entering foreign markets 
greatly rely on institutional structures in host countries to minimize uncertainty and risk of 
dissipation of these assets (Oxley, 1999; Trevino and Mixon, 2004).  
 
In this study, we extend prior literature by asking the following questions: (i) To what extent 
do Chinese institutions influence FDI inflows from the EU? (ii) What are the effects of the 
interaction between R&D intensity and host country institutions on EU FDI in China? We 
choose China as an empirical setting to explore the above questions for the following reasons. 
China, just like other emerging countries, has weak institutions which encompass weak legal 
system, problems of intellectual property enforcement, corruption, and rule of law, which can 
cause greater transactional hazards, make firm returns less predictable and uncertain thereby 
deterring FDI inflows (Xu, 2011). Second, China’s accession to the WTO marked a milestone 
in the transformation and integration of China into the world economy through a number of 
reforms agreed as part of conditions for entry with palpable implications for FDI inflows into 
China. Despite the massive reforms after the WTO, no study provides evidence regarding the 
interaction between the WTO related reforms, rule of law, firm-specific R&D and FDI inflows 
in emerging market context. This study therefore fills this research gap.  
 
This paper makes two primary contributions to the literature. First, we examine the role of 
emerging country institutions and how firm-specific R&D capability of the EU firms interacts 
with host country institutions to influence FDI inflows into emerging markets. Emphasizing 
how specific institutional elements shape MNE strategies and impact FDI inflow decisions 
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provide an improved understanding of what really informs investment strategies of MNEs. 
Second, the institutional environment in which FDI activities are located is of increasing 
importance to MNE managers as they seek to protect their strategic assets and leverage their 
innovative capabilities across countries. The results of our study enrich the extant research by 
shedding lights on the determinants of FDI in emerging market context and contribute to the 
institutional theory. More specifically, the study of EU MNE investments in China offers the 
opportunity to examine how a country with distinctive institutions fits into institutional-based 
view. It is important to point out that although this study focuses on China, the findings have 
implications for other emerging and developing economies as the reforms in these countries 
have centred on improving institutions to help attract capital funds and technology which are 
often scarce in emerging markets. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews literature on FDI activity, 
institutional reforms in China and theoretical background underpinning the study. Section 3 
presents the hypotheses of the study. Section 4 presents the sample selection and methods used 
in this study, followed by an analysis and discussion of the regression results. The final section 
concludes the paper and discusses the implications of the study.  
 
2. FDI reform policies and theoretical background  
2.1. European Union FDI inflows in China 
The value and volume of inward FDI in China have witnessed a rising trend over the past 
three decades. The official statistics from MOFCOM indicate that- as illustrated in Figure 1- 
total FDI into China increased from US$916 million in 1983 to US$131 billion in 2017, which 
is a staggering increase of over 14 thousand percent.1 Similarly, Figure 2 indicates that FDI 
                                                 
1 Although China began to receive FDI in 1979, official data on inward FDI by country of origin are available 
only from 1983 onwards. 
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from the EU to China increased in terms of value from US$3.98 billion in 1998 to US$8.79 
billion in 2017. 
 In 2009, EU companies invested €5.3 billion in China according to MOFCOM, with almost 
half of EU FDI to China going into the manufacturing sector, particularly machinery, transport 
equipment and chemical products. Further analysis of the inward FDI from the TRIAD (i.e., 
EU, United States and Japan) into China over the 1998-2008 period suggests that compared 
with the U.S. and Japan, the EU recorded an annual average growth of 8.9% as a leading 
investor in China. During the financial crisis of 2007-2008, FDI inflows stabilized at US$5.41 
billion, while that of the U.S. and Japan fell to US$3.19 billion and US$3.95 billion, 
respectively (MOFCOM, 2010). Overall, the European Union has been among the leading 
investors in China over the 1998-2017 period.  
 
 (Insert Figures 1 & 2 here) 
 
2.2. Institutional theory and reforms in China       
Previous literature (see North, 1990; Child and Rodrigues, 2005, Bevan et al., 2004; 
Hoskisson et. al., 2000) highlight the importance of institutions in shaping the investment 
behaviour of firms. As a result, recent empirical literature have utilized the institutional-based 
view to analyse both micro-organisational and macro-organisational phenomena in the context 
of emerging countries (see Khoury and Peng, 2011; Du and Boateng, 2015).  These studies 
suggest that the explanatory power of institutional theory is ascribed to the fact that government 
and societal influences are stronger in emerging economies than in developed countries 
(Hoskisson et al., 2000; Du and Boateng, 2015). Institutions defined as “the rules of the game” 
help shape the strategies, structures, and competitiveness of firms (North, 1990). The role of 
an institution within an economy is to reduce both transaction and information costs through 
the reduction of uncertainty, ensures a stable structure that facilitates interaction and allows 
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enterprises to move beyond institutional barriers (Oliver, 1991). Prior empirical studies have 
confirmed that regulative institutions and reform policies in host countries have a strong 
influence on FDI inflows. Researchers such as Busse and Hefker (2007) and Du and Boateng 
(2015) echo similar view and document that developing and emerging countries carry out 
institutional and market reforms to attract resources like capital funds, management skills and 
innovative technologies they do not have via FDI. Scholars argue that institutions which are 
“friendly” towards FDI, such as stable economic policies, security of property rights, less 
ownership restrictions, and non-corrupt bureaucracy, are conducive to attracting FDI from 
MNEs (Bevan et al., 2004; Grosse and Trevino, 2005; Pajunen, 2008). More importantly, good 
institutions provide foreign investors with the confidence required to engage in R&D 
investment abroad with little fear for risk of asset dissipation. However, weak institutions in a 
host country such as weak legal systems and corruption are perceived to be hazards that 
increase transaction costs and chances of private asset being appropriated. Grosse and Trevino 
(2005) found institutional variables such as corruption and political risk to exert negative 
influence on FDI inflows in Central and Eastern Europe. Similarly, Busse and Hefeker (2007) 
study of 83 developing countries showed that government stability, corruption, law and order 
and quality of bureaucracy are highly significant determinant of FDI inflows. In summary, the 
overall thrust of the institution-based view is that a firm’s internationalization strategy is shaped 
by the institutional framework of the host country.  
Despite the continuing importance and usefulness of the analytical framework advanced by 
North (1990), it should be noted that the institutions-as-rules framework is parsimonious and 
ignores important institutional features (North, 2005). McCloskey (2016) shares similar view 
and points out the limitations of the institutions-as-rules approach. According to McCloskey 
(2016), rules do not constrain behaviour (“rules are, well, rules”, p. 2) and that institutionalised 
behaviour is often followed without enforcement by the state. Thus, McCloskey (2016) 
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emphasises the motives that make people follow a rule of behaviour through their beliefs and 
norms as against institutionalised rules that people are forced to follow as espoused by North 
(1990). The argument of McCloskey (2016) is consistent with the views of Greif (2006: p.7) 
who noted that rules “are nothing more than instruction that can be ignored”. However, Greif 
(2006) contends that taking the reasons that people follow rules as exogenous to the analysis, 
as North’s institutions-as-rules approach does, is useful for a number of purposes. For example, 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006; 2012) point out that it is particularly useful in the “institutions 
as power” school of New Institutional Economics which has wide applications. 
 
In the context of China, we have observed unprecedented reforms in the institutional 
environment over the past two and a half decades in general and after entry into WTO in 
particular. We argue that these reforms may help explain the distinctiveness of the foreign firms’ 
behaviour regarding FDI inflows in China. In this context, we briefly summarize the main 
developments and changes in Chinese government policies towards inward FDI in the pre- and 
post- WTO accession in Table 1. 
 
       (Insert Table 1 here) 
 
3. Hypotheses development 
3.1. WTO entry and FDI inflows 
China's accession to the WTO has led to further opening up of China to FDI activity. Foreign 
investors are now allowed to enter some sectors that were barred from foreign investors (Hong, 
2008). To comply with WTO rules, the Chinese government agreed to accelerate legislative 
and institutional reforms, make policies stable and predictable, remove special protections 
given to state-owned enterprises, create an impartial, competitive business environment and 
unify market regulations (Jiang, 2006). The above changes appear consistent with the argument 
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put forward by Ozawa (1992) and Wysokinska (1998) that FDI affects and reflects the 
structural transformations in the economy. The reforms of institutions after the entry into WTO 
may therefore attract more FDI into China. To investigate the role of institutional liberalization 
towards FDI, we introduce a time dummy for pre-WTO and post-WTO accession (after 2001) 
as a proxy of institutional reforms outlined in Table 1. Thus, ceteris paribus, we hypothesize 
that:  
 
Hypothesis 1: The liberalization/institutional changes carried out after China’s WTO entry in 
2001 is positively related to EU FDI inflows. 
 
3.2. Rule of law and FDI in China 
The general changes that accompanied China’s entry into the WTO (a proxy for institutional 
change) did not include the rule of law. However, rule of law is an indicator for the quality of 
the legal environment and has implication for foreign investors. The “rule of law” captures the 
perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society 
and, in particular, the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police and the courts 
as well as the likelihood of crime and violence (Bannaga et al., 2013). Consistent with findings 
of Grosse and Trevino’s (2005) in Central and Eastern Europe, we contend that the quality of 
legal institutions is positively related to FDI inflows because it reduces uncertainty and lowers 
the cost of doing business. However, this assertion is valid only if the rule of law plays effective 
roles. Researchers such as Herrera-Echeverri et al. (2014) support the contention that quality 
of legal environment increases the level of investors’ confidence in host country institutions 
and the willingness to engage in FDI activity. Conversely, inadequate legal quality, poor law 
enforcement and poor legal environment have a negative effect on FDI activity (Aidis et al., 
2012).  
 
In the context of China, the establishment of the rule of law has become a priority of Chinese 
government since 1999. The constitution has been amended and the rule of law has been 
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enshrined. The Central Committee of the Communist Party has decided to make courts more 
independent and to penalize officials who interfere with the administration of justice. Despite 
the changes and massive reforms, a number of researchers suggest that problems relating to the 
rule of law still exist (see Wu et al., 2007). The development of the rule of law in China is 
based on the socialist legal system that bears Chinese characteristics (The Economist, 2014). 
For example, Rajagopalan and Zhang (2008) point out that the weaknesses in the legal system 
in China include laxity in the enforcement standards, and weak judiciary system. For example, 
China does not have judicial precedents and Chinese government through National People’s 
Standing Committee provides interpretation tools to help Chinese business implement various 
laws and regulation (Ho et al., 2012). This may lead to inconsistency in the application of the 
laws when there is a dispute between MNEs and the state. Thus, this raises questions about the 
independence of judiciary and law enforcement agencies, and whether any increase in the 
quality of rule of law in China may attract more FDI. In light of the above, we hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis 2: The level of the rule of law quality in China is negatively related to EU FDI 
inflows into China. 
 
3.3. Corruption 
Corruption refers to acts by which the power of public office is used for personal gain in a 
way that contravenes the rules of the game (Jain, 2001). The literature on FDI determinants 
indicates that corruption has influence on FDI inflows (Wei, 2000). However, the results appear 
mixed. For example, Cuervo-Cazurra (2006) reported that corruption is beneficial in attracting 
FDI inflows in developing countries. He showed that corruption leads to relatively higher FDI 
inflows in countries with high level of corruption. However, studies such as Grosse and Trevino 
(2005) and Wei (2000) found the increase in corruption in the host country to be negatively 
associated with FDI. Similarly, Zhao et al. (2003), Barassi and Zhou (2012) argue that 
corruption distorts the allocation of resources, increases transaction costs and negatively affect 
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FDI inflows. Smarzynska-Javorcik and Wei (2005) reported a significant and negative impact 
of corruption on FDI. Although China is relatively successful in attracting FDI, corruption is 
seen as a challenge to China’s economy and to its social reforms. In the light of this, we 
hypothesize that:  
 
Hypothesis 3:  The level of corruption is negatively related to EU FDI inflows into China. 
                          
3.4. Interactions of R&D & WTO entry                         
A number of researchers such as Dunning (1993) suggest that R&D capability is positively 
related with FDI, and this notion has received theoretical and empirical support. It is thus 
argued that firms possessing technological advantage may enter foreign markets to recover 
their costly R&D2, prevent product obsolesce and gain market share (Tihanyi and Roath, 2002). 
Researchers such as Stoian and Filippaios (2008) and Lin (2010) have rendered some support 
and document that R&D increases the probability of firms’ international expansion. However, 
a number of researchers such as Patel and Vega (1999) and Busse and Hefeker (2007) 
emphasize the importance of host country institutions on MNE R&D location and investment 
decisions. Lenway and Murtha (1994) and Murtha and Lenway (1994) echo similar view and 
point out that institutional environment is a critical determinant of where MNEs locate their 
investment, and what types of investment will be made. It may therefore be argued that FDI 
entry decisions and for that matter FDI inflows may be conditioned by the interaction between 
institutional reforms and a firm’s R&D intensity. MNEs will be inclined to invest in an 
environment that has a system that gives protection and allows ownership of proprietary assets 
such as R&D to be exploited in the host country without undue risk and appropriation of their 
assets by other parties. This argument suggests that liberalization of foreign investment 
regulations and reforms designed to improve the host country’s institutions may interact to 
                                                 
2 Following Wei and Liu (2006), R&D intensity is proxied as intangible assets scaled by total assets.  
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create environment for FDI inflows to occur consistent to OLI paradigm (Estrin et al., 1997; 
Grosse and Trevino, 2005). This may be especially important in emerging countries where the 
level of uncertainty appears high due to opaque regulatory regimes, complex procedures and 
poor institutions which often lead to high transaction costs and risk of asset dissipation (Grosse 
and Trevino, 2005). Despite the above argument, no study has explicitly tested the effects of 
interaction between reforms after WTO entry and R&D on FDI inflows. In this study, we argue 
that the reforms after the WTO entry may give EU firms more confidence to engage in FDI 
activities in China despite the fact that WTO rules WTO litigation processes are cumbersome 
and costly. Thus, we argue that:  
Hypothesis 4: The interaction of EU firms with high R&D activities and institutional changes 
associated with WTO accession will be positively related with FDI inflows in China. 
 
3.5. Control variables  
Based on the extant literature, a number of control variables are taken into account, including: 
export intensity (Lin, 2010), firm leverage (Stoian and Filippaios, 2008; Forssbaeck and 
Oxelheim, 2008), and firm age (Luo et al., 2009). In addition, we control for profitability, 
wages and firm size. Profitable firms have more resources with which to undertake further 
expansion via FDI (Cantwell and Sanna-Randaccio, 1993). Locations that have a lower cost of 
labour can attract greater FDI flows (Sethi et al., 2003). The empirical evidence tends to suggest 
that lower wages attract FDI; however, other studies have found mixed results (e.g., Owen, 
1982). The size of a firm reflects its capacity to engage in investments abroad (Buckley and 
Casson, 1976). Following Trevino and Grosse (2002), we control for product innovation which 
is measured as the natural logarithm of output involving new product innovation. We control 
for advertising intensity, which serves as a proxy for a firm's ability to differentiate its products 
from those of its competitors. The view related to firm-specific advantages recognizes the 
importance of tangible assets (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). Therefore, we include a tangible 
asset variable, operationalized as fixed assets per employee, to capture the role of such assets. 
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We also control for individual ownership, as private/personal owners are more likely to face 
more constraints in China compared to corporate entities (Zhou et al., 2015).  
 
Prior studies that have investigated the location advantages-based variables of OLI paradigm 
indicate that market size (GDP); trade openness and exchange rate exert influence the MNE 
decision to expand into the international markets (Uddin and Boateng, 2011). Researchers such 
as Duanmu and Guney (2009) argue that a higher GDP (market size) implies better prospects 
for FDI inflows into the host country. This is because as markets increase in size, so do the 
prospects for higher demand within the economy and consequently FDI, in order to meet the 
demand in that economy. We therefore control the market size. The ratio of trade to GDP is 
often used as a measure of the openness of a country and is also interpreted as a measure of 
trade restrictions. A greater degree of openness encourages a higher inflow of FDI, primarily 
because open markets are more attractive as a destination of FDI (Chakrabarti, 2001). We also 
control for the exchange rate. Table 2 provides details of data sources, the proxies/definitions 
of the variables, the theoretical justification, and their expected effects on FDI inflows into 
China.   
 
                                                    (Insert Table 2 here) 
 
4. Data and methodology 
4.1. The sample  
We construct our sample based on the data on foreign activities of EU manufacturing firms 
in China from the Annual Reports of Industrial Enterprises Statistics compiled by the National 
Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS). The annual report covers the population of firms (both 
foreign and local) with an annual turnover of over five million Renminbi (about US$785,000) 
inside China. The dataset contains information on firm ownership structure, industry affiliation, 
geographic location, establishment year, employment, gross output, sales, R&D, value added, 
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net fixed assets, exports, and employee training expenditures. The original dataset covers an 
unbalanced panel of EU firms spanning the period 1998-2008 with data for 33 two-digit 
manufacturing industries and over 400 four-digit industries (the year 2009 was not included as 
for some of our variables we had missing data). 
 
All firms in China, whether local or foreign, are required by law to complete the census survey 
conducted by NBS. Therefore, the dataset is valuable for the following reasons. First, census 
data are reliable and internally consistent for empirical studies (Pan et al., 1999). Second, as a 
specialist body mandated to carry out the census survey, the NBS pays special attention to 
ensuring the quality of the data and the accuracy of the information in the report and identifying 
and eliminating inconsistency in the reported figures. A notable feature of these data is that the 
information disclosure by firms is compulsory, leading to a 100% response rate. Third, our 
dataset covers a period up to 2008 where recent firm level data are available, and that allows 
us to control for observable and unobservable firm-level characteristics to reduce aggregation 
bias. The multi-year census data enable us to employ a panel data structure to test our models. 
Thus, we can investigate firms’ foreign investment activities over time and test the dynamic 
causal relationship, which is the main advantage over static cross-sectional data (Dunning, 
1998; Gao et al., 2010). 
 
Another feature of the dataset is that EU firms are classified under five ownership categories: 
state-owned, collective-owned, corporate-owned, privately owned, and Hong Kong, Macao 
and Taiwan-owned (HKMT-owned), while a continuous measure of other ownership 
composition is constructed from the dataset by looking at the fraction of capital paid by other 
investors. This is the key variable as far as this paper is concerned, as it identifies the level of 
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treatment received by EU firms in China.3 This feature remains a unique enterprise identifier 
irrespective of the dynamics of ownership change. In this study, we focus on privately (personal) 
owned share variables and the other variable is the largest (dynamic) change among ownership 
structure under the more liberal Chinese FDI policy with respect to ownership. Accordingly, 
we identified less than 0.9% personal share capital at the start of the sample (i.e., 1998), and 
by the end of the sample period (2008), more than 18% of these firms were still under majority 
EU ownership capital. The dataset has the necessary time-series information for dynamic panel 
data analysis by the GMM technique. Our final dataset consists of an unbalanced panel of 2,932 
observations from 680 EU firms over the period 1998-2008 in China after standard data 
filtering. We follow the criteria from the first Economic Census in classifying the EU firms 
into 30 sectors in large- and middle-sized manufacturing industries and into 9 industries 
according to their  SIC classes. 
4.2. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics and all of the correlations are fairly low with the 
exception of trade openness, firm size and exchange rate variables, which show high 
correlations. Consequently, we carried out a variance inflation factor (VIF) test, and all of the 
factors are well below the acceptable level of 10 except -by default- the quadratic terms, namely, 
R&D2 and Firm size2. With respect to the mean values of the explanatory variables, firm 
profitability is 6.4%. The leverage ratio is approximately 51%. Private/personal ownership is 
less than 1%, which appears to be low. The established age of the EU firms is over 14 years. 
Regarding the export intensity, approximately 17% of EU firms’ sales are in the form of exports. 
Finally, the R&D intensity is just over 3%. 
                                 (Insert Table 3 here) 
                                                 
3 The sample includes firms from the following EU countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom. 
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4.3. Analysing FDI determinants  
To test our hypotheses, we adopt three econometric approaches in the panel regression 
estimation: OLS, random effect (RE) and fixed effect (FE). We report both RE and FE outputs 
for comparative purposes even though the Hausman test favors the latter. Beside these, in order 
to provide some robustness with respect to endogeneity, simultaneity and heterogeneity 
concerns and to conduct regressions based on autoregressive &dynamic models, we also use 
the difference- and system-GMM estimations (see Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and 
Bover; Blundell and Bond, 1998).  
While it is widely acknowledged that regression analysis provides useful forecasts, a number 
of studies indicate that the use of cross-validation can strengthen the robustness of regression 
results (Armstrong, 1985). More recently, studies by Woodside (2013) and Soyer and Hogarth 
(2012) echo similar views and called on researchers in management to move beyond standard 
regression analyses. Responding to this call, we also use cross-validation technique to check 
the robustness of our results.  
 Our multiple regression equation is as follows:  
 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘 ∗ Institutional𝑘 +∑ 𝛾𝑘 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑚
𝑘=1
𝑛
𝑘=1                                   (1)        
                                             
where Institutional refers to the set of our main variables of interest related to enterprise 
reforms and institutional factors pertaining to rule of law and corruption and their interaction 
with R&D; Controls refers to the set of our control factors relating to macroeconomic and firm-
specific factors; α (constant term), β’s and γ’s are estimable coefficients; ε is the error term; i 
and t stand for firm and time, respectively. FDI is either FDI 1 or FDI 2.   
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5. Regression results and discussions 
This section reports the regression results and discusses the influences of host country 
institutional factors and their interaction with the investing firm R&D on FDI decisions in 
China. Our initial findings reveal that time and industry dummies are not statistically 
significant. This may be expected because all of the firms in our sample are from the 
manufacturing sector, and some institutional factors already account for time effects. Hence, 
we do not include these dummy variables in our models, noting that the inclusion of these 
dummies does not change the robustness of the results. 
 
5.1. Institutional factors and FDI inflows in China 
Table 4 reports the regression results based on three methods.4 The estimations indicate that 
institutions in China have significant effects on inward FDI from the EU. We find WTO 
dummy (a proxy for institutional changes associated with WTO) to exert a positive and 
significant influence on FDI inflows in China. The findings suggest that China entry into WTO 
appears to be beneficial thereby exerting a positive influence on FDI inflows. Perhaps the 
compliance of WTO rules which enjoined China to reform specific institutions regarding FDI 
procedures, and corporate governance system appears to engender confidence among EU 
investors. Hypothesis 1 is therefore supported.  
The coefficients of Rule of law and Corruption have negative and positive signs, respectively, 
with the Rule of law having significant parameters at the 1% level in all models. The negative 
relationship between the rule of law and inward FDI suggests that despite enterprise and other 
regulatory reforms in China, it appears that the quality of the rule of law with regards to its 
effectiveness still remains weak thereby exerting a negative effects FDI inflows made by 
European Union firms. Hypothesis 2 is therefore supported. The results may be explained by 
                                                 
4 Censored Tobit regressions were conducted because our dependent variable is limited and cannot take negative 
values. The Tobit results (not reported) are very similar to the OLS estimates. 
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the fact that China still lacks a quality legal system, rendering the enforcement problematic 
(Rajagopalan and Zhang, 2008). For example, a case between the state and foreign investors 
are likely to go in the Chinese government’s favour, as the laws can change at random. 
Moreover, the intellectual property rights (IPR) infringement is a huge problem for European 
firms in China. According to EU report in 2007, seven out of ten European businesses operating 
in China indicate that they have been victims of IPR violations. This report also indicates that 
European manufacturers estimated that IPR theft cost them 20% of their potential revenues in 
China, and this may explain the results. Regarding corruption, our results indicate that 
corruption appears to have an insignificant effect on FDI inflows. Hypothesis 3 is therefore not 
supported with this set of results. 
We also considered the possibility of the non-monotonic association of FDI with R&D and 
size.5 The results confirm non-linear associations for these factors. Therefore, we report the 
results below assuming a non-linear (reverse U-shaped) association of FDI with R&D and firm 
size. Our results in table 4 show that higher R&D intensity improves FDI inflows into China, 
but after some point, R&D and FDI inflows move in the opposite directions. The findings 
further reveal that firm size and FDI are positively (negatively) linked for smaller (larger) firms; 
suggesting that size constitutes an important source of monopolistic advantages for EU firms, 
which is consistent with the findings by Pradhan (2004) for Indian manufacturing firms. 
 
                                                 
5 Pradhan (2004) argues that FDI and size and R&D may be linked non-monotonically due to monopolistic 
advantage such that FDI first increases with size but then decreases after the threshold point. The hypothesis of a 
positive link between R&D and the propensity to undertake FDI has been extensively tested and confirmed (e.g., 
Grubaugh, 1987; Lall, 1980; Lin, 2010; Lin and Yeh, 2005; Markusen, 1995). Conversely, concerning labor-
seeking investments, the literature generally indicates a negative relationship as international delocalization in 
search of low labor costs is less likely for firms basing their competitive advantages essentially on product and 
process innovation. As regards resource-seeking investments, the empirical evidence seems to suggest a negative 
link (Dunning, 1993). On the other hand, Paul and Wooster (2008) report no significant link between R&D and 
FDI. Our paper thus considers these conflicting arguments and hence empirically examines the presence of a non-
linear link between FDI and R&D. When the parabolic terms of R&D and firm size are dropped in the regression 
models, the results for the other variables do not change their quality. Yet, we prefer to include these terms as 
explained above.  
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5.2. Interaction of R&D and WTO entry 
Regarding the interaction between R&D and WTO entry, the coefficients are consistently 
positive and significant. Hypothesis 4 is therefore supported. The results indicate that 
liberalization of foreign investment regulations and enterprise reforms designed to reduce the 
host institutional barriers interact with firm R&D to influence FDI inflows in China. These 
findings imply that FDI entry decisions are affected not only by the R&D intensity of foreign 
firms but also are conditioned by its interaction with institutional reforms in the host country. 
 
Regarding the control variables, we find a number of macroeconomic variables, namely, 
market size, trade openness and exchange rate to exert significant influence on FDI inflows in 
China. The results render some support for location-based advantages of OLI paradigm 
(Dunning, 1993).  
Regarding the results for firm-specific control variables, we find wages, profitability, tangible 
assets, personal owned shares, export intensity and firm leverage to have significant influence 
on FDI inflows. However, we find that private/personal ownership and profitability to have a 
negative and significant effect on FDI inflows in China 
                               (Insert Table 4 here) 
 
5.2. Sub-Sample Analysis of WTO Entry 
China’s entry into the WTO induced additional liberalization. To investigate whether Chinese 
accession to the WTO changed the pattern of EU firms’ FDI inflows into China over the period 
in question, we divide our data into two time periods as pre- and post-WTO (i.e., 1998-2001 
and 2002-2008, respectively). Table 5 reports the FE results only because Hausman test 
suggests that the RE and OLS models can be rejected in favour of the FE and also the regression 
model is not dynamic. 
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               (Insert Table 5 here) 
Regarding the results of institutional variables, namely, the rule of law appears to a negative 
and significant in the regression model of post-WTO period. This finding is similar to the full 
sample results reported in Table 4 with the exception of the coefficient which appears lower 
for post-WTO period. This finding is unsurprising in the sense that the changes which occurred 
in the post-WTO era did not include the legal and judiciary systems. We find that corruption 
has a negative and significant effect on FDI in the post-WTO period. This finding may be 
explained by the fact that after the implementation of WTO accession agreements, firms in 
China may have become relatively transparent due to reforms such as improved standards of 
reporting systems, accountability and awareness and the detrimental effects of corruption on 
FDI inflows. Yet, it seems their attempts failed to convince the foreign investors. The results 
therefore do not lend support to hypothesis 3. On the other hand, the coefficients of the R&D 
and R&D2 also exhibit a positive and negative signs consistent with the findings in Table 4. 
 
We probe further the influence of WTO entry on FDI inflows in China. Consequently, we 
analysed whether the results of the interaction between the rule of law and EU firm R&D is 
altered or moderated by the reforms accompanying WTO entry in the period of 2002-2008. 
Our regression results indicate that the coefficient of the interaction term is negative but 
insignificant prior to the WTO entry. However, the coefficient for the interaction between the 
rule of law and R&D becomes positive and significant after the WTO entry. The findings 
suggest that the negative effect of this interaction term is nullified by the reforms which 
accompanied the WTO entry. The results appear interesting and suggest that EU firms with 
high R&D investment in particular, see the WTO entry has led to some improvements in rule 
of law, thereby influencing in their decision to invest in china. The results are robust after 
controlling for macroeconomic and firm-specific determinants of FDI. Regarding the control 
variables, one exceptional observation is trade openness and exchange rate appear significant 
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only for the post-WTO period. The positive impact of trade openness may be because the 
Chinese government liberalization of foreign trade policy for the manufacturing industry after 
WTO membership thereby leading to more inward FDI in China, as posited by conventional 
theories.  
 
5.3. Robustness check and dynamic analyses 
One concern in analysing the relationship between institutions and FDI is the endogeneity 
problem. The regression of institutions on FDI that underlies the “institutional effect” argument 
is a classic example of a regression that is likely to suffer from two endogeneity problems such 
as reverse causality and measurement error. For example, it may be argued that FDI inflows 
rather lead to reforms in the institutions. However, using fixed effects method would not 
alleviate the endogeneity problem (Istaitieg and Rodriguez, 2006). Moreover, FDI 
determinants change over time (see Dunning, 2000). In particular, we believe that institutional 
reforms after China’s accession to the WTO may explain the FDI determinants of EU firms in 
China. To account for this and mitigate the distortions caused by fixed effects, we also employ 
the difference-GMM and system-GMM methods to check the robustness of our results. The 
system estimator regression results only are reported in Table 6. We also employed an 
alternative measure for R&D based on aggregate R&D expenditure divided by sales. The 
GMM results (robust to the diagnostic tests with valid instruments) reported in Table 6 appear 
more or less similar to that documented in Table 4 and Table 5. 
                                  (Insert Table 6 here) 
We examine whether EU firms optimize their FDI levels in China due to various costs and 
benefits by looking at the effect of lagged FDI on current FDI. The coefficient estimates on 
lagged FDI are consistently positive, in the [0, 1] range and statistically significant except in 
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one case.6 The findings imply that there is some evidence that EU firms tend to adjust their 
FDI level in China in an attempt to reach the desired level. Our results are in line with the 
conclusion drawn by Carstensen and Toubal (2004) who examined FDI in Central and Eastern 
European countries using country-level data. The sensitivity of the coefficient estimates on 
lagged FDI to the FDI definition regarding the significance level means that firms seem to 
adjust the relative level of FDI compared to total capital rather than to the absolute FDI when 
models 3 and 4 are compared. Our finding that past FDI feeds forward subsequent FDI is 
consistent with the results obtained by Luo et al. (2008).  
 
5.4. Path dependency framework 
 
According to Teece et al. (1997), firms’ dynamic capabilities are related to their competence 
to integrate well, build, and reconfigure internal and external factors to respond to the 
constantly changing environment. In other terms, the competitive advantage, profitability and 
innovativeness of firms partly depends on the path they have adopted. The authors then go on 
to imply that quasi-irreversible commitments makes past very relevant and the current position 
of firms is dependent upon past path. As firms update their knowledge and build up experience, 
one can contend that corporations that had FDI activities in the past are more likely to continue 
to invest compared to their peers that have no FDI experience into a specific region or country. 
Similar to this setting, Duanmu (2014) finds that FDI location choice is strongly path dependent 
on the past trading links between the host and the home countries. The notion that 
internationalization by companies is a dynamic process is also acknowledged by Araujo and 
Rezende (2003), and Casillas et al. (2012) who examine the export behavior of firms with 
survey data, and Gao and Pan (2010) who examine US multinational firms’ sequential entries 
in foreign markets (China). 
                                                 
6 As expected, the magnitude of the coefficients pertaining to the lagged FDI under the system-GMM setting is 
higher when compared to the difference-GMM setting because for the latter such coefficients tend to be 
downward-biased. 
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The fact that the coefficient estimates on our lagged FDI are positive and significant is in line 
with the path dependence framework. In specific, Gao and Pan (2010) argue that it should be 
more reasonable for a firm to have slow pace when switching from low to high resource 
commitment, which implies the slow speed of adjustment and high adjustment costs when the 
speed is too high. As a more related paper, Busse et al. (2011) adopt the system-GMM 
estimation method and report positive and strongly significant lagged FDI coefficients that vary 
between zero and one (similar to ours) and state that these findings strongly support the path 
dependence process. 
5.5. Cross-validation tests 
 
Table 7 reports the result of cross-validation test of the sub-samples using the FE model. 
Spearman's rho and independent t-test indicate that the model does have acceptable predictive 
validity. The signs of the coefficients in each sub-sample maintain its consistency.  
                (Insert Table 7 here) 
To confirm the result above, a second validation test was carried out using the system-GMM 
setting.7 The coefficients of each sub-sample group model were used to predict the dependent 
variable of two sub-samples. A predictive validation test was made comparing the results 
obtained with the two dependent variables (FDI 1 and FDI 2) of each sub-sample. Again, 
Spearman's rho and independence test indicate that the models do have acceptable predictive 
validity as reported in Table 8. 
    (Insert Table 8 here) 
6. Conclusion 
This study extends the existing literature on the determinants of FDI to an emerging country 
which has experienced unprecedented reforms over the past three decades. Our regression 
                                                 
7 For brevity, we do not report the corresponding difference-GMM results but they are available upon request. 
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results indicate that the quality of host country institutions plays an important role in explaining 
the EU FDI flows into China after controlling for macroeconomic and firm-specific factors, 
rendering support to the institutional theory. We find the rule of law in China to exert a negative 
and significant influence on inward FDI. This finding implies that despite legislative reforms 
resulting in the improvement of the rule of law in China, the rule of law in China remains 
problematic and impedes inward FDI. The policy implication here is that, China needs to 
improve further the overall legal environment, particularly the intellectual property rights laws 
and their enforcement to help reduce transaction costs and encourage personal/private investors 
seeking opportunities to grow in China. Similar concerns hold for the effective tackling of 
corruption in order to attract more foreign investment. Regarding the enterprise and other 
institutional reforms, the positive relationship between the institutional reforms and FDI 
inflows implies that institutional reforms (liberalization of FDI procedures, and corporate 
governance reforms) put in place to comply with WTO's rules are steps in the right direction 
and should be pursued further. 
The study also finds the interaction between WTO entry and R&D facilitates FDI inflows in 
China. The results imply that FDI entry decisions are not only influenced by the R&D intensity 
of foreign firms but are conditioned by its interaction with enterprise and institutional changes 
in the host country. In order to gain more insights into the effects of WTO entry on FDI inflows 
in China, we test whether the effects of the interaction between the rule of law and EU firm 
R&D is moderated by the institutional changes which accompanied WTO entry. Our regression 
results indicate that the coefficient for the interaction between the rule of law and R&D is 
positive and significant after WTO entry. The results imply that the effects of reforms which 
accompanied the WTO entry affected the rule of law and positively influence EU firms’ 
decision to invest in China. Another implication to be drawn from the findings of this study is 
that understanding the role of host country institutions may serve as a lesson for policy makers 
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and senior managers in other emerging countries regarding the policy changes to be 
implemented to attract FDI into their countries. Regarding firm-specific level R&D and firm 
size, the study finds that R&D activities and firm size have non-linear relationship with FDI 
inflows (reverse U-shape).  
 
While this paper has shed some lights on the institutional influences and their interaction with 
R&D on FDI inflows in China by EU firms, it is important to point out that our dataset is 
limited to 2008 due to the absence of more recent EU firm data compiled by National Bureau 
of Statistics of China. More studies appear warranted using more recent data, when data 
becomes available. Future studies should concentrate on the effects of both formal and informal 
institutions and their interaction with firm-specific R&D intensity on FDI inflows using cross-
country data involving emerging and developing to enable generalizability to a more larger 
population.  
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